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We analyze the role of discretionary joint fixed costs in audit production. Given such costs, the 
investment decision and production of audit services must be analyzed over a client portfolio. We 
model this problem, and use monotone comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon [1994]) to show 
the implications of variations in client-specific losses and the number of clients for the optimum 
level of fixed investment and audit assurance. We develop four hypotheses concerning the 
relations between audit quality and (1) the magnitude of potential client-specific losses; (2) average 
client losses in a portfolio; (3) the number of clients in a portfolio; and (4) the variability of losses 
in a portfolio. Using discretionary accruals as the audit quality proxy, we find evidence consistent 
with these hypotheses. Using PCAOB inspection results, and financial statement restatements as 
proxies for audit quality, we find weaker evidence consistent with hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. 
 
 







1. Introduction and prior literature 
 
 In this paper we analyze the role of discretionary fixed costs in audit production. Such costs 
can be changed period-to-period by an audit firm’s management, but are fixed at a moment in time 
and are common or joint across a set of the firm’s audit clients. Our motivation is to better 
understand the interaction of the production and supply of audit services and audit market 
outcomes. Outcomes of interest include audit quality (i.e. audit assurance), the number of hours 
utilized to service a client, and audit costs. Discretionary fixed costs can be associated with a 
variety of investments that are made by a public accounting firm to facilitate its audit production, 
including location specific investments (e.g. the construction of local offices), firm-wide training 
programs for staff, and investments in audit technology. We conjecture that such investments 
affect the transformation of audit effort (hours) into assurance, and that these investments (i.e. 
fixed costs) influence production primarily through their effect on the efficiency of audit effort 
(i.e. process improvements). Efficiency increasing investments (often referred to as labor 
enhancing or productivity enhancing) can result in either lower cost audits or higher assurance 
levels, or a combination of the two outcomes. 
 The investments and associated costs that we analyze are those that affect the audit of more 
than a single client. Considered over multiple time periods, such costs are constant for a given 
period of time, and are joint across the audits (of at least a subset) of clients serviced in that period. 
We do not consider client-specific set-up costs that may be incurred when performing an audit. A 
key implication of our focus on these discretionary, fixed, joint or common costs is that the 
investment decision and the production of audit services cannot be fully analyzed on a client-by-





 Existing research (e.g. O’Keefe, Simunic, and Stein [1994], Bell, Doogar, and Solomon 
[2008], Akono and Stein [2014]) models audit production as a simple transformation of variable 
labor inputs into audit assurance, without explicitly considering how (if at all) the efficiency 
enhancing investments and the associated fixed costs enter into that transformation. While the 
paper by Ye and Simunic [2017] also considers efficiency enhancing investments, the investments 
and associated costs are assumed to be client-specific. In the absence of significant efficiency 
enhancing common fixed costs, the production of audit services for a specific client is largely 
separable from the audit production for other clients in the audit firm’s client portfolio. This greatly 
simplifies the audit production problem. When the efficiency enhancing investments and the 
resulting common fixed costs are an important feature of audit production, individual audits are 
no longer separable because these investments will improve the efficiency of the production of all 
audits, or at least a subset of the firm’s audits (e.g. clients in certain industries). Audit firms need 
to aggregate these effects when making investment decisions.  
 Process improvements can be general for an audit firm’s whole pool of clients or limited 
to a subset of specific clienteles.  The modeling strategy we employ in this paper is flexible as it 
can be extended to cover a multitude of auditing scenarios (e.g. audit firms as a whole, industry 
specialization, etc.), at least to a first approximation. Our modelling strategy is novel, and we test 
four hypotheses on the relationship between an audit firm’s client portfolio characteristics and 
audit quality. The analysis does not encompass investments by the auditor that target the demand 
side of the auditing market such as investments in advertising or customer relations. 
 We focus on the supply side of the auditing market. Supply conditions are critical to 
understanding the market for audit services because a large portion of the audit market operates 





implies that the demand for varying levels of audit quality is essentially a matter of auditor choice 
(e.g. Big 4 vs. non-Big 4, or specialist vs. non-specialist), with the chosen supplier determining 
the details of assurance production. The fact that a well specified and calibrated audit fee model 
(e.g., Simunic [1980], Hay, Knechel and Wong [2006]) is able to explain 80% or more of the cross-
sectional variation in the logarithm of U.S. audit fees (which reflect audit costs) using variables 
that capture supply-side work scope (e.g., client size and complexity) and the risk imposed by 
association with a client on the auditor, suggests that supply-side factors are key to understanding 
observable market outcomes.  
Most existing research has treated audit production as simply involving variable labor 
inputs which are (in some way) transformed into audit assurance, i.e., the probability, as assessed 
by the auditor and financial statement users, that a client’s financial statements are not materially 
misstated. A significant exception is the paper by Sirois, Marmousez, and Simunic [2016] which 
applies the endogenous fixed cost (EFC) model developed by Sutton [1991] to the auditing 
industry. In Sutton’s model as applied to auditing, technology plays a central role in determining 
the level of audit quality and audit fees. Sirois et al further argue that Big 4 auditors make 
differentially greater technology investments than non-Big 4 auditors and strategically compete on 
both quality and price through these investments in technology, the level of which is increasing in 
market size. Ferguson, Pinnuck and Skinner [2016] also apply Sutton’s EFC model to explain audit 
market structure and the emergence of the two-tier audit market (Big 4 vs. non-Big 4) in Australia.   
 While Sutton’s EFC model incorporates technology investments and fixed costs, the 
application of the EFC model to the analysis of the auditing industry has been largely verbal and 
ad hoc. By contrast, in this paper we formally analyze the audit production problem when fixed 





auditor’s problem as a simple expected cost minimization problem with client-specific labor hours 
and the level of fixed investments (that benefit the audits of all clients) as the auditor’s choice 
variables, and audit assurance as an outcome variable. This formulation is equivalent to a profit 
maximization problem with fixed audit fees. We provide an analytical solution to this cost 
minimization problem for a case in which specific functional forms of the assurance production 
function and fixed investments cost function are assumed. We also provide numerical solutions 
for both the special case and a broader class of reasonable functional forms. Next, the problem is 
restated as a cost minimization problem, but with the level of fixed investments and the level of 
assurance as the choice variables and the client-specific audit hours defined implicitly as a function 
of the choice variables. This formulation facilitates the application of monotone comparative 
statics (Milgrom and Shannon [1994]) to describe the more general relationship between the 
characteristics of an auditor’s client portfolio and the level of investment and client-specific audit 
assurance.  
These analyses lead to several testable hypotheses regarding audit quality and the 
characteristics of individual clients and the auditor’s portfolios of clients. We test these hypotheses 
first by using the absolute value of discretionary accruals as the proxy for audit quality and using 
four definitions of audit markets ranging from the broad U.S. national market (all publicly listed 
companies) to companies operating in specific U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in 
specific 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industries. To address the concern that the 
financial reporting outcomes (e.g., absolute discretionary accruals) may be caused by clients’ 
fundamentals rather than auditor-provided assurance, we employ two other measures that more 
directly capture the auditors’ inputs as the proxies for audit quality.   First, we examine the number 





the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) regular inspection of registered 
audit firms. Then, we use financial statement restatements as another proxy for audit quality in our 
supplemental analysis. The results of these various empirical tests suggest that the audit 
investments associated with the discretionary fixed common costs that affect the production of 
some (or all) of an audit firm’s portfolio of clients are an important, hitherto unexamined feature 
of audit production which can help explain auditor-specific and client-specific systematic 
variations in audit quality.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up a basic 
formulation of the audit production problem where production requires variable labor input(s) but 
fixed costs are not explicitly considered as a choice variable, either because they do not exist or 
because technology and other investments associated with fixed costs are given. This formulation 
is consistent with the way audit production has been conceived and modeled in the existing 
literature. In section 3, which is the conceptual / theoretical core of our paper, we introduce 
investments as a choice variable and the associated fixed costs into the analysis. We set up models 
that describe audit firms and their clients by several exogenous parameters, and study the 
characteristics of optimal production including the levels of investment, variable labor hours used, 
and assurance levels provided. We also develop the comparative statics of the auditor’s expected 
cost minimization problem. We conclude this section by developing testable hypotheses that 
follow from our analyses. In section 4, we develop the empirical design for testing the four 
hypotheses and report the empirical results. The last section summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2. A Basic Model of the Audit Production Problem 





 A common assumption for analyzing audit production is that the competition in the market 
for audits and/or the production of audits given a fixed audit fee motivate auditors to minimize the 
costs of audit production (e.g., Simunic [1980], Dye [1993]). Formalizing this insight, a rational 
auditor planning the audit of a single client using audit hours of various types (i.e. a choice among 
junior, senior, manager, and partner hours) might solve (in concept) the following program: 
1) Minimize c(h) = w ∙ h + L • [1 - q(h, a) ] 
 
 s.t. q(h, a) = 𝑞𝑝, 
 
where,  c(•),  is the total cost function, 
  h,  is a vector of audit hours of various types (e.g. junior, senior etc.), 
  w,  is a vector of factor costs of various types of audit hours, 
  L,  is the potential loss an auditor may incur through her association with a  
   client’s financial statements 
  q(•),  is the audit transformation function in which audit hours    
   are transformed into assurance, where assurance is the auditor assessed  
   probability that the post-audit financial statements are free  of material  
   misstatement.1 
  𝑞𝑝, is the planned level of assurance,  
  a, is a fixed audit investment (e.g. technology) parameter affecting audit  
   efficiency, and 
  (1 - q), is the probability of a post-audit loss. 
 
Imposing appropriate structure to assure a solution and emphasizing that a is fixed and not a choice 
variable, then the auditor’s problem is to pick the cost minimizing h, i.e. 
 
  𝒉∗ =  argmin
𝒉
𝑐(𝑎, 𝒘, 𝐿, 𝑞𝑝, 𝒉) 
 
                                                 
1 The assurance production function, q(•), implicitly includes all phases of an audit, i.e. planning, risk assessment, 





 If there is an interior solution to this problem, then it would be characterized by the usual 
equalities between the ratios of the marginal rates of transformation and the ratios of the factor 
costs (input prices). This model carries the essence of the auditor’s cost structure implicit in most 
empirical cross-sectional audit fee or audit hour studies involving multiple labor inputs and was 
used to motivate the empirical analysis of the audit hours utilized by a major public accounting 
firm in O’Keefe, Simunic, and Stein [1994] and Bell, Doogar, and Solomon [2008]. 
 If we specify an appropriate audit hour transformation function and substitute in parameter 
values then, in theory, we could write down an audit cost function relative to the parameters as: 
 
2) c(ℎ∗| a, w, L, 𝑞𝑝). 
 
 We can view 2) as a foundational model used to motivate archival audit fee studies where 
w, the vector of wage rates, is assumed to be exogenous, and a represents the fixed investment in 
technology and other factors utilized by the auditor. L, the potential loss, varies across clients and 
is likely a function of the size, complexity, and other characteristics of the client (e.g. a closely 
held vs. a listed company) as well as the legal and institutional environment associated with the 
audit. We expect the potential loss to increase with client size, complexity, etc. and as the legal 
and institutional regime becomes more onerous to auditors. Because liability is ultimately 
constrained by the financial resources of the audit firm and / or its professional liability insurance, 
L is finite and bounded from above. To focus on the essential features of audit service production 
and to simplify our analyses, we assume that auditors are strictly liable for failing to detect material 
misstatements in financial statements (i.e. there is no “negligence defense” based on adherence to 
auditing standards) or the combination of auditing standards toughness and vagueness is such that 





 In program 1), 𝑞𝑝  is assumed to be fixed either by Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
(GAAS) or by audit firm policy.  While this is a common assumption in the existing literature.2  
the treatment of the planned level of assurance as a fixed parameter potentially conflicts with cost 
minimization. If 𝑞𝑝 is fixed in advance or predetermined then there is no guarantee that c(ℎ∗| a, w, 
L, 𝑞𝑝) will satisfy the requirement that c(ℎ∗ | a, w, L, 𝑞𝑝) < c(ℎ, 𝑞 |a, w, L) for all allowable 
combinations of {h, q}. If, on the other hand, q is assumed to vary audit by audit then program 1) 
would need to be changed to reflect optimization over both h and q. 
 Program 1) is a short-run cost minimization problem where fixed costs are treated as both 
predetermined and sunk. This is consistent with existing literature in assuming that fixed costs (a) 
are a predetermined characteristic of the audit firm which are unobservable by the researcher. 
Empirically, the lack of controls for fixed investment is not necessarily problematic. If fixed costs 
vary across auditors, then an auditor fixed effect potentially captures the cross-sectional 
differences. Or if there is no across auditor variation in investment (due, perhaps to competition), 
then the rental costs of fixed investments are included in the mark-up on cost. This mechanism is 
consistent with the normal practice in service firms to add mark-up on direct labor costs to bill 
overhead and earn profits.  
 However, fixed costs can play an important role in audit production. Some investments 
associated with fixed costs (e.g., the adoption of a more intensive staff training program, or the 
construction of a more powerful information system) can change the efficiency (marginal product) 
of the various classes of labor to be transformed to audit assurance. Consequently, the changes in 
the marginal product of labor will impact the vector of labor hours required to achieve the planned 
level of assurance, 𝑞𝑝. Given that fixed investments can change the efficiency of audit labor and 
                                                 
2 For example, audit quality is usually assumed to vary systematically between Big 4 vs. non-Big 4 firms, but audit 





that the fixed costs are shared by the auditor’s portfolio of clients, fixed costs, audit cost, and audit 
quality are endogenously determined by the auditors’ cost minimization (given fixed audit fees) 
or profit maximization over its portfolio of clients.  
2.2 ANALYSIS WITH MULTIPLE CLIENTS 
Before analyzing the role of fixed costs in the auditor’s cost minimization problem, we first 
extend program 1) to incorporate a portfolio of clients, which better captures the reality of audit 
production. In rewriting program 1), we represent any fixed investments by the parameter a in the 
assurance transformation function. Higher levels of a imply larger fixed investments.  In order to 
simplify notation and because the mix of labor types is not important to subsequent analyses, we 
assume a single type of labor going forward.  Consequently, w and h are treated as scalars. Program 
1) can be extended to incorporate a portfolio of clients: 
3) Minimize w.r.t. ℎ𝑖:  ∑ 𝑐𝑖(ℎ𝑖) 
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1 = w ∑ ℎ𝑖  
𝑛𝑡




 s.t. q(ℎ𝑖, a) = 𝑞
𝑝, for all i ∊ 𝑛𝑡, 
where 𝑛𝑡  is the number of clients in auditor t’s set of clients. If audit production is separable in the 
sense that ℎ𝒊 is independent of any other ℎj, then program 3) is a simple adding up of model 1). 
However, interdependencies might enter the cost functions either through the loss function (see 
Simunic and Stein [1990]) or through the assurance transformation function, as would occur if 
learning increased the efficiency of labor. Given the interdependencies of the cost of individual 
audits in affecting the auditor’s total cost, the optimal vectors of ℎ𝑖’s should be jointly determined 
across the auditor’s client portfolio, rather than determined on an audit by audit basis. Further, if 





for the firm to solve for the optimal 𝑞𝑝 at the portfolio level. That is, if there is a fixed level of 
planned assurance as in 3) then dependencies are also built into the problem.  
 
3. Re- formulating the Audit Production Problem  
 
3.1 AUDIT PRODUCTION WITH INVESTMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH 
DISCRETIONARY FIXED COSTS 
 In modeling the role of discretionary fixed costs in audit production, we treat the 
technology and other investments associated with discretionary fixed costs, i.e., the parameter a, 
as an input to the auditor’s assurance transformation function. We assume that such fixed 
investments do not directly provide assurance, but rather affect the labor hours needed to produce 
a given level of assurance. That is, in our model, discretionary fixed costs operate indirectly 
through the relationship between the usage of hours and the production of assurance.  As a 
consequence of this assumption, fixed investments and costs are inherently efficiency oriented. 
Investments in technology and other fixed costs reduce the marginal use of labor hours for any 
target level of assurance.  
 To formulate the audit production problem in which efficiency enhancing discretionary 
fixed costs are an auditor’s choice variable, we rewrite program 3) which emphasizes that the 
problem is solved by each auditor at the audit firm level. Importantly, we conjecture and 
subsequently drop the constraint which characterizes the prior literature that the assurance level 
produced must equal some planned, target level. If there are t auditors in the market and each 
auditor has nt clients, we denote auditor t’s choice of investment as 𝑎t. Thus auditors: 
4) minimize
𝑎𝑡,ℎ𝑖
∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑎𝑡, ℎ𝑖) 
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1 = min w ∑ ℎ𝑖  
𝑛𝑡







 s.t. q(ℎ𝑖, 𝑎𝑡) = 𝑞𝑖, for all i ∊ 𝑛𝑡, 
where f(𝑎𝑡) is the fixed rental cost of 𝑎𝑡. We assume df/da > 0 and d
2f/da2 ≥ 0; that is, the fixed 
costs of investing in technology and other factors increase at a non-decreasing rate. The auditor 
chooses a parameter value 𝑎𝑡 and a vector of client-specific labor hours, hi , that minimize the total 
(expected) cost of auditing her portfolio. In program 4), because q(ℎ𝑖, 𝑎𝑡) = 𝑞𝑖  is a function of 𝑎𝑡 
and ℎ𝑖, 𝑞𝑖  varies across audits (see section 3.2 below) and an audit-firm specific level of assurance 
is achieved in terms of a portfolio average. 
 
3.2 SOLUTION TO THE COST MINIMIZATION PROBLEM WITH 𝑛𝑡 IDENTICAL 
CLIENTS AND KNOWN FUNCTIONS FOR f(𝑎𝑡) AND q(ℎ𝑖, 𝑎𝑡) 
 To obtain some intuition into the solution of program 4), suppose that an auditor has 𝑛𝑡 
identical clients and is considering a new fixed investment, say in technology, that improves the 
efficiency of production for each client. We rewrite program 4) to incorporate the identical client 







 )  = argmin
𝑎𝑡, ℎ𝑡
  𝑛𝑡 w ℎ𝑡+ 𝑛𝑡 𝐿 (1 - 𝑞𝑡
 ) + f(𝑎𝑡) 
 s.t. 𝑞𝑡 = 𝛽 𝑎𝑡
  ℎ𝑡
1/2 ∀ 𝑖 ∊ 𝑛𝑡 and 0 ≤ 𝑞𝑡   ≤ 1 
where  is a positive normalizing constant. To derive an algebraic solution to this problem we also 
need to specify a functional form for f(•), the cost of the fixed factor 𝑎𝑡. We let 
6) f(𝑎𝑡) = 𝑘𝑡 • 𝑎𝑡
3. 
Importantly, the cost of 𝑎𝑡 increases quickly enough to offset the concavity of the assurance 





 Assuming an interior solution and working through the math (not shown), we solve for 
the optimal values of the choice variables in terms of the parameters: 
𝑞𝑡
∗= ( 𝐿5 𝑛𝑡
2  𝛽5) / (72 𝑘𝑡
2  𝑤3),  𝑎𝑡
∗ = ( 𝐿2 𝑛𝑡  𝛽
2) / (6 𝑘𝑡
  w),  and  ℎ𝑡
∗ = ( 𝐿6 𝑛𝑡
2  𝛽6) / (144 𝑘𝑡
6  𝑤4) 




∗, individually increase in L and 𝑛𝑡 and decrease in w and 𝑘𝑡. 
 To get a better sense for these results, we solve the problem numerically for a variety of 
parameter values. In the table below we set  =.0018, w =50 and 𝑘𝑡
  = 2,000 and then vary both the 
number of clients and the size of the potential loss of the clients. Optimal outcomes in terms of 
total portfolio audit cost, fixed investment, audit effort per client, and assurance levels provided 
are reported in the table below. 
 
𝑛𝑡 L Cost a* h* q* 
40 65,000 2.59924*106 0.9126 1.14007 0.974421 
40 60,000 2.39953*106 0.7776 0.705277 0.653035 
35 60,000 2.09969*106 0.6804 0.539978 0.49998 
 
As a check on these results, we re-specify the model using an asymptotic assurance 
transformation function. The quadratic assurance function specified in equation (5) can easily hit 
the 100% assurance upper bound as a and h increase, so as an alternative we use the following 
function: q = a h / ( + a h). This function converges to 100% assurance as a and h increase to 
infinity. Using this functional form of q plus modifying equation 6) to f(𝑎𝑡) = 𝑘𝑡 • 𝑎𝑡  allow the 
program to be solved analytically to derive optimal parameterizations of the choice variables (the 





the following parameter values:  = 10, w =50 and 𝑘𝑡
  = 2,000 and once again varying both the 
number of clients and the size of the potential loss of the clients. The results are given in the 
following table. 
 
𝑛𝑡 L Cost a* h* q* 
40 65,000 140,224. 23.2272 23.2272 0.981802 
40 60,000 136,486. 22.6003 22.6003 0.980798 
35 60,000 124,825. 20.6629 23.6148 0.979918 
 
In both examples, audit firms are assumed to be endowed with different numbers (𝑛𝑡) and 
different types (Lt ) of clients, and are solving for the optimum production plan for their specific 
client portfolio. Summarizing the numerical results presented in the above two tables, we observe 
that i) the high risk portfolios (large L), ceteris paribus, use more labor, make larger fixed cost 
investments, and provide higher assurance and ii) that auditors with the greater number of clients, 
ceteris paribus, make larger fixed costs investments and provide a higher level of assurance. In 
the quadratic assurance case the auditor with the greater number of clients uses more labor hours 
per client, while in the asymptotic assurance case the auditor with the greater number of clients 
uses fewer labor hours. 
  In both of the examples if we hold the size of the potential loss constant, then the average 
cost per client is lower for the portfolio with the larger number of clients. This result, if true in 
general, suggests that larger auditors could provide higher levels of assurance and undercut the 
prices of smaller auditors – see footnote 3, below. Specific implications of this observation to audit 





research, but does raise the question: Is the provision of auditing services a potential natural 
monopoly? We leave more extensive consideration of this question for future research.  
 
3.3 CLIENT SPECIFIC ASSURANCE AND CLIENT SPECIFIC POTENTIAL LOSSES 
 
 In section 3.2, we assumed that each audit firm had 𝑛𝑡 identical clients. In this section, we 
generalize the results by considering the case where each audit firm has two clients that possess 
different potential losses. We rewrite equation 5) to represent a portfolio with two clients of 
varying potential losses and assume that 𝐿1 > 𝐿2 . Substituting in the auditor’s assurance 




 ) =   𝑤 ∑ { ℎ𝑖  +  𝐿𝑖(1 − 𝑞𝑖( 𝑎𝑡, ℎ𝑖) )} + f(𝑎𝑡)
2
𝑖=1   
Taking the first order conditions for 7):  
8 i) 𝐿1  𝑞𝑎𝑡(𝑎𝑡, ℎ1) + 𝐿2 𝑞𝑎𝑡(𝑎𝑡, ℎ2)} =  𝑓𝑎𝑡(𝑎𝑡) 
8 ii) 𝐿1  𝑞ℎ1(𝑎𝑡, ℎ1) =  𝑤  
8 iii) 𝐿2 𝑞ℎ2(𝑎𝑡, ℎ2) =  𝑤   
 Because 𝐿1 > 𝐿2  we can see from equations 8 ii) and 8 iii) that 𝑞ℎ1 < 𝑞ℎ2, this implies 
that at the optimum ℎ1 > ℎ2 if we assume that 
𝜕𝑞
𝜕ℎ
≥ 0 and 
𝜕2𝑞
𝜕ℎ 𝜕ℎ
< 0. Since we expect that 
assurance increases with audit effort and that the marginal increase in assurance decreases as 
effort increases (decreasing marginal returns), these two assumptions (i.e. 
𝜕𝑞
𝜕ℎ
≥ 0 and 
𝜕2𝑞
𝜕ℎ 𝜕ℎ
< 0 ) 
are readily justified.  
The result then is that the client with the larger potential loss is audited to a higher level of 
assurance than the client with the smaller potential loss. This is in contrast to the usual way audit 





assurance is delivered for each client (perhaps with random noise). The idea that assurance varies 
systematically (not randomly) client-by-client around a firm mean is consistent with an economic 
approach to the auditor’s problem in which auditors maximize their profits. In contrast, if the 
assurance level is set as a constraint to be equaled or bettered, then it is hard to see that strategy as 
being consistent with profit maximizing. It might be more consistent with the traditional 
professionalism approach to audit planning, where audit firms are not simply profit maximizing 
(cost minimizing) but try to maximize some type of social welfare function. But if the 
professionalism approach violates profit maximization, is it realistic - particularly when audit 
markets are competitive? 
 
3.4 COMPARATIVE STATICS OF THE AUDITOR’S COST MINIMIZATION PROBLEM 
 In this section, we drop the known functional forms imposed on the assurance production 
function, q(ℎ𝑖, 𝑎𝑡), and the cost of fixed investments, f(𝑎𝑡), and develop a general approach to 
the comparative statics of the auditor’s cost minimization problem.   
 Consider an auditor with a portfolio of 𝑛𝑡 clients facing the following ex-ante single 
period decision problem: 
9)   𝜋(𝑎𝑡
 , 𝒒𝒊












 𝜽     = {𝑳𝒕, 𝑤 , 𝑘}, is a set of parameters. Noting{𝑳𝒕} is a vector and {w, k} are  
         scalars;  
H(𝑎𝑡
 , 𝑞𝑖) = ℎ𝑖 , ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑛𝑡 . H(•) is the auditor’s labor function defined implicitly with  
        arguments investment, a, and assurance, q; 





f(𝑎𝑡),     is the one period rental cost of fixed investment.  
In this model, the auditor chooses parameter values {𝑎𝑡, 𝒒𝒊) – as distinct from (𝒉𝑖, 𝑎𝑡) in 
our earlier formulation – to maximize the total (expected) profit of auditing her portfolio. We 
specialize the profit maximization model by assuming revenues are fixed. Doing so equates profit 
maximization with cost minimization. This is consistent with our primary interest in audit 
production. Restricting our attention to the cost minimization component of the model allows us 
to highlight the supply side of the market without engaging the multiple complications introduced 
by market demand conditions. We acknowledge this restriction reduces the generality of our 
results insofar as we are unable to fully characterize the optimal levels of assurance and investment 
in equilibrium. However, the solution to the auditor’s cost minimization problem yields crucial 
insights from the supply side about the relationships among the auditor’s portfolio of client 
potential losses, the optimal provision of assurance, and the utilization of audit input factors even 
without a fully specified demand side model.  
Next, we again simplify the representation of the auditor’s portfolio to the number of clients 
and the average size of the clients’ potential losses. With these assumptions in place the profit 
maximization problem 9) is restated as a cost minimization problem: 
10)  𝑐(𝑎𝑡
∗, 𝑞𝑡
∗| 𝜽) =  minimize
𝑎𝑡,∈𝑅+





) + 𝑛𝑡  𝐿𝑡(1 − 𝑞𝑡) + f( 𝑎𝑡)   




∗(𝜃)} =  arg 𝑚𝑖𝑛





 | 𝜽)   
Defining audit hours implicitly allows us to rewrite the cost function with investment and 
assurance as the choice variables. Since we expect audit assurance, q, to be an increasing function 











≥ 0, and 
𝜕2𝐻
𝜕𝑎 𝜕𝑞
≤ 0.  In words, we expect: i) audit effort to decrease in 
the level of investment, holding assurance constant, ii) audit effort to increase in assurance, holding 
investment constant, and iii) the rate of increase in audit effort due to an increase in assurance 
decreases as investment increases. For completeness we also expect that 
𝜕2𝐻
𝜕𝑞 𝜕𝑞




Two assurance transformation functions that fit this characterization are the ones we used earlier 
in our numerical examples: the quadratic assurance function, 𝑞𝑖 = 𝛽 𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑖
1/2
,  and the asymptotic 




A benefit of defining audit effort implicitly is that we can eliminate the requirement that 
{𝑎𝑡
 , ℎ𝑖
 }satisfy the bounds implied by the assurance variable and replace these constraints with the 
requirement that the domain of 𝑞𝑖  is the closed interval [0,1]. This is helpful in our later analysis 
since the domain of the subsequent minimization is a lattice defined on the product space [0,1]  ×
 ℝ+
1 . Below we outline the connections between the cost minimization model and our empirical 
tests. 
 
The Application of Monotone Comparative Statics to the Auditor’s Cost Minimization Model. 
We use the above representation of the cost minimization model to generalize our analysis 
of changes in the parameters, 𝑛𝑡  and 𝐿𝑡, on audit production.  One way to do this is to apply the 
techniques of monotone comparative statics (MCS) Milgrom and Shannon [1994]. To see how this 
approach works, first transform the minimization problem, equation 10), into a maximization 
problem by multiplying through by -1. Then take the set of optimal solutions to the cost 
minimization problem given in equation 11),{𝑎𝑡
∗(𝜃), 𝑞𝑡
∗(𝜃)}, and ask the question: what conditions 





(weakly) increasing or decreasing in the scalar parameter 𝜃? The short answer is that if the feasible 
set is a lattice and the objective function has increasing (decreasing) differences in each of the pairs 
{a, q}, {a, 𝜃}, and {q, 𝜃}, then the required conditions are met for the comparative static result, 
i.e., the optimal values are jointly increasing (decreasing) in the chosen parameter. The increasing 
(or decreasing) differences condition does not, in general, require that the objective function to be 
either differentiable or concave and the MCS results can be obtained by verifying that the 
increasing differences criterion holds. If one is willing to assume the differentiability of the 
objective function, an assumption we apply for convenience and to make the verification procedure 
more transparent to readers not familiar with MCS and Topkis’ theorem Topkis [2011], then 
increasing differences can be checked by demonstrating that the appropriate pairwise cross-partial 
derivatives are weakly positive on the feasible set, the fore-mentioned lattice. 
 
Demonstration that Assurance and Investment are Non-decreasing (weakly increasing) in Client 
Potential Loss 
 We begin by defining a function d(•): 
12)  𝑑(𝑎𝑡
 , 𝑞𝑡




) + 𝑛𝑡  𝐿𝑡(1 − 𝑞𝑡) + f(𝑎𝑡) )  
To show that {𝑎𝑡
∗(𝐿), 𝑞𝑡
∗(𝐿)}  are increasing in L we take the following cross-partial 














 , 𝐿) = 0, 
13 iii) 𝑑𝑞,𝐿(𝑎𝑡
 , 𝑞𝑡





All three of the required conditions (the pair-wise cross-partial derivatives are weakly 
positive) are easily seen to hold. This verifies that the objective function is characterized by 
increasing differences in each of the three relevant pairs. 
 
Demonstration that Assurance and Investment are Non-decreasing (weakly increasing) in the 
Number of Clients in an Audit Firm’s Portfolio. 
Now to show that {𝑎𝑡
∗(𝑛𝑡), 𝑞𝑡
∗(𝑛𝑡)} are increasing in 𝑛𝑡 we take the following cross-partial 
derivatives of equation 12) substituting in 𝑛𝑡for 𝜽: 
14 i) 𝑑𝑎,𝑞(𝑎𝑡
 , 𝑞𝑡
























) + 𝐿𝑡   ≥ 0 = 0 
 Conditions 14 i) and 14 ii) are met given our assumptions on the hours function H(•). 




)  +  𝐿𝑡  = 0 is a first order necessary condition for 
optimality of the cost function (we assume the usual regularity conditions for an interior optimum 
of the cost function are met). 
Increasing Client Loss Variance Decreases Average Assurance and Investment: A Three Client 
Numerical Model 
In order to relax the assumption that 𝐿𝑡 is constant within an auditor’s portfolio, we take 
equation 10) and form an auditor portfolio consisting of three clients. Next, we define the auditor’s 
cost function as: 
















 H(𝑎, 𝑞𝑖) =
𝑞𝑖
𝑎(1−𝑞𝑖)
 , the audit hours function with 𝐻𝑎(𝑎, 𝑞𝑖) < 0,  𝐻𝑞(𝑎, 𝑞𝑖) > 0, 
     𝐻𝑎𝑎(𝑎, 𝑞𝑖) > 0,  𝐻𝑞𝑞(𝑎, 𝑞𝑖) > 0 and 𝐻𝑎𝑞(𝑎, 𝑞𝑖) < 0.  
The potential losses for these three clients are defined as: 𝐿1 = 𝐿 + 𝜔,  𝐿2 = 𝐿 and 𝐿3 =
𝐿 − 𝜔, for 𝜔 > 0  which implies that 𝐿1 >  𝐿2 >  𝐿3, and we set f(𝑘, 𝑎𝑡) =  𝑘𝑎𝑡
2. The assumption 
that f(•) is convex in 𝑎𝑡 is required for the result. Linear investment costs reverse the numerical 
results. 
We constructed the above potential loss portfolio to be a mean preserving spread. The mean 
of the client portfolio is increased by increasing L and the variance of the portfolio is increased by 





 }. The numerical results are suggestive of how the model would extend to auditor 
portfolios with varying client potential losses. In our numerical calculations we normalized the 
wage rate to 1 (numeraire good) and set k = 200. The potential loss parameter values are listed 




























 As can be seen in the table above, increasing the variance of client specific losses in an 
audit firm’s portfolio decreases optimal investment, average assurance, and portfolio cost. 
Interestingly, the assurance level for client 2 also falls as portfolio variance increases even though 






3.5 TESTABLE EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 Based on the foregoing analyses, we consider four empirical tests. Specifically: 
1. For a given audit firm, audit quality is client specific and increases with the size of the 
potential client specific losses (𝐿𝑖
 ). This test follows from our assertion in section 3.3 that 
varying assurance on a client-by-client basis is more consistent with cost minimization than 
auditing to a static level of assurance when an auditor services heterogeneous clients. 
2. In an audit market, the average audit quality produced by an audit firm increases as the 
average client Li in the firm’s portfolio of clients in that market increases
3 (as average 𝐿i
  
increases, 𝑎𝑡
∗ increases, and 𝑞𝑖
∗ increases).  
3. In an audit market, average audit quality produced by an audit firm increases as the number 
of clients (nt) in the firm’s portfolio increases (as nt increases, 𝑎𝑡
∗ increases, and 
𝑞𝑖
∗ increases). 
4. In an audit market, average audit quality decreases as the variability of client losses (Li ) in 
the firm’s portfolio increases. 
 We note that these predictions derive solely from production (i.e. supply-side) 
considerations and do not make any assumptions about the demand for audit quality except that 
audits are normal goods (i.e. given audit cost, more assurance is preferred to less).  
 
4. Empirical Tests 
                                                 
3 In addition to increasing assurance levels, the labor enhancing characteristic of audit investment also implies that 
auditors with larger investments become more efficient in the sense they will require fewer audit hours for a given 
client and potentially incur lower costs to audit marginal clients than audit firms with lower levels of investment. We 
conjecture that the resulting market structure will depend upon the interplay of optimal investment scale and market 
size. For example, a sufficiently large audit market could sustain multiple auditors operating at optimal scale and 
remain competitive since no audit firm gains a cost advantage due to the equalization of investment. In contrast, audit 





4.1  KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 The four empirical implications in section 3.5 predict that, in an audit market, the audit 
quality of a specific client increases with the potential client-specific losses, the audit firm’s 
portfolio average of potential client-specific losses, the number of clients in the audit firm’s client 
portfolio, and audit quality decreases with the variability of the potential client-specific losses. To 
test H1, we use the natural logarithm of clients’ total assets (Ln(Asset)) as the proxy for client-
specific losses (𝐿𝑖
 ). Accordingly, for H2, the potential average client losses are proxied by the 
average value of the natural logarithm of clients’ total assets, i.e. the average client size 
(AvgClientsize). The number of clients in the audit firms’ client portfolio (Clientnum) corresponds 
to H3. To test H4, the variability of the potential client-specific losses is proxied by the standard 
deviation of client size (StdClientsize). 
To construct an audit firm’s client portfolio, we define four audit markets: (1) the broad 
U.S. national market, which includes all publicly listed companies; (2) U.S. public companies 
operating in specific 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industries; (3) companies 
operating in specific U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs); and (4) companies operating in 
specific U.S. MSAs in specific 2-digit SIC industries. The four audit markets are denoted as M1, 
M2, M3, and M4, respectively. Note that the market level at which our empirical predictions as 
developed from the theoretical model should be observable depends on the market level where 
investments are made by audit firms.  For example, the effects of investments in staff training at 
the national level should be observable in market M1.  Or, if audit firms make more local 
investments that benefit audits of clients in certain industries, the effects should only be observable 






4.2 PROXIES FOR AUDIT QUALITY 
Audit quality is defined as the auditor assessed level of assurance (probability) that the 
financial statements are free of material misstatements after an audit is completed that results in 
the issuance of an unqualified (normal) opinion on the financial statements.4 An ideal proxy for 
audit quality should (somehow) measure this probability, which, of course, is not directly 
observable.  Note that auditor assurance is developed throughout the audit process that 
encompasses planning, risk assessment, substantive testing, and completion procedures (such as 
second partner review). Thus auditor assurance incorporates the auditor's assessment of client 
managements’ contribution to the preparation of accurate financial statements through their 
personal integrity, quality of accounting systems and controls, etc. We use several variables as the 
proxies for audit quality: the absolute value of discretionary accruals, the number of audits with 
deficiencies as well as the number of the audit firms’ specific failures as reported in the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) inspection reports, and (in a supplementary 
analysis) financial statement restatements.  
Absolute discretionary accruals have been used in a considerable amount of the prior 
literature as a proxy for audit quality or as the outcome of a high quality audit (e.g. Becker et al. 
[1998]). This proxy allows us to obtain a client-specific measure of audit quality. This measure is 
the outcome of the financial reporting process and can be affected by client characteristics. 
Accordingly, we control for client-specific characteristics in our empirical tests of the four 
predictions.  
                                                 
4 Audit quality is normally defined as the joint probability that an auditor discovers any material misstatements that 






In addition to the absolute value of discretionary accruals, we use the number of audits 
with deficiencies, and the number of the audit firms’ specific failures as identified by PCAOB’s 
inspection as two other proxies of audit quality. To enhance the audit quality of public companies, 
Section 104 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and PCAOB Rule 4003 require the PCAOB to 
regularly inspect PCAOB-registered accounting firms that provide audit reports for U.S.-listed 
public companies. The inspections identify matters that the inspection team considered to be audit 
deficiencies, which include failures by the audit firm to perform, or to perform at a sufficiently 
high level, certain necessary audit procedures.5 After an inspection, the PCAOB  sends inspection 
results on engagement-specific audit deficiencies and the identified defects in the audit firms’ 
quality control system to the audit firm inspected. The results on engagement specific audit 
deficiencies are listed in the inspection reports published on the PCAOB web site. The disclosed 
information regarding engagement specific audit deficiencies are (1) the number of the inspected 
audits that contain deficiencies of “such significance that it appeared to the inspection team that 
the Firm, at the time it issued its audit report, had not obtained sufficient competent evidential 
matter to support its opinion on the issuer’s financial statements”6, and (2) the specific failures to 
perform sufficient procedures in supporting its audit opinions. As compared to the absolute 
                                                 
5 Section 104 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 requires the PCAOB to “(1) inspect and review selected audit and 
review engagements of the firm (which may include audit engagements that are the subject of ongoing litigation or 
other controversy between the firm and 1 or more third parties), performed at various offices and by various associated 
persons of the firm, as selected by the Board;(2) evaluate the sufficiency of the quality control system of the firm, and 
the manner of the documentation and communication of that system by the firm; and (3) perform such other testing 
of the audit, supervisory, and quality control procedures of the firm as are necessary or appropriate in light of the 
purpose of the inspection and the responsibilities of the Board.” As documented in Auditing Standard No. 3, paragraph 
9 and Appendix A to AS No. 3, paragraph A28, an observation that the audit firm did not perform a procedure, obtain 
evidence, or reach an appropriate conclusion may be based on the absence of such documentation and the absence of 
persuasive other evidence.  
6 A typical PCAOB inspection report contains this description before describing specific audit failures. An example 





discretionary accruals, these two PCAOB inspection-based proxies better capture auditors’ input 
in providing audit assurance and are less likely to be affected by client characteristics. 
Finally, we also use restatements as another proxy for audit quality in our supplemental 
analysis. Different from discretionary accruals which is the output of the financial reporting 
process and the audit deficiencies identified by the PCAOB’s regular inspection of registered 
accounting firms, financial statement restatements occur because a material misstatement exists in 
the audited financial statements.  Thus a restatement is more probable as the quality of an audit 
(assurance) decreases.  Misstatements may be discovered either by client management or the 
auditor after the audit report is issued. More specifically, factors affecting the revelation of an 
existing material misstatement include the investigation of the company (i.e. the auditor’s client) 
by private parties (e.g. analysts, employees, and lawyers can be the whistleblowers), a Securities 
and Exchange Commission investigation, and the external legal environment that affects the firm’s 
decision to restate earnings. For instance, as evidenced by Srinivasan, Wahid, and Yu [2014], firms 
operating in an environment with stronger rule of law are more likely to admit their mistakes in 
financial reporting, when material misstatements exist. Given the multiple-factors driving a 
restatement, the absence of a restatement is not necessarily an indicator of high audit quality, 
although a restatement provides direct evidence of audit failure in the restated year. In contrast, 
because the PCAOB inspection is on a regular basis and is directly related to the quality of audit 
production, the inspection results may provide a better audit-quality measure.7  
 
4.3 REGRESSION MODELS 
                                                 
7 The PCAOB Rule 4003 mandates that public accounting firms auditing more than 100 U.S. public companies should 






Using the absolute value of discretionary accruals as the proxy for audit quality, we build 
the following model to test our four empirical predictions. 
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝑆𝑡𝑑𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝐺𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼11𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼12𝑆𝑡𝑑_𝐶𝑓𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼13𝑆𝑡𝑑_𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼14𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼15𝐹𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼16𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼17𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                     (16)   
where the AbsoluteDACi,t is the absolute value of performance adjusted discretionary accruals of 
client i in year t. We follow Kothari et al. [2005] in constructing performance controlled 
discretionary accruals by requiring at least 10 observations in each 2-digit SIC industry to calculate 
discretionary accruals. Ln(Asset) and AvgClientsize are proxies for potential client-specific losses, 
and the average of potential client-specific losses, and these two independent variables are the key 
variables of interest for testing the first (H1) and the second (H2) empirical predictions. Clientnum 
is the total number of an audit firm’s clients in an audit market and StdClientsize is the variability 
of potential client-specific losses in an audit firm’s client portfolio in that market. Clientnum and 
StdClientsize are the key variables of interest for testing the third (H3) and the fourth (H4) 
empirical predictions. H1 predicts that the greater the client-specific loss exposure, the higher the 
assurance level provided by auditors, and the lower the discretionary accruals.  Accordingly the 
coefficient (𝛼1) on Ln(Asset) is predicated to have a negative sign. H2 and H3 predict that the 
coefficients (𝛼2  and 𝛼3) on AvgClientsize and Clientnum also both have a negative sign. H4 





Among the four key independent variables, client size (Ln(Asset)) is a client-specific 
variable, and the other three variables are measured using auditors’ client portfolios in the audit 
markets we defined. Corresponding to the four audit markets, for each auditor-year, AvgClientsize, 
Clientnum, and StdClientsize have four values. We denote the four values with the prefixes M1, 
M2, M3 and M4, respectively. We test the empirical predictions for the four categories of audit 
market by applying the key independent variables (i.e. AvgClientsize, Clientnum, and 
StdClientsize) calculated based on the four categories of audit market in (16).  
 We draw from the prior literature (e.g., Gu, Lee, and Rosett [2005] and Zang [2011]) and 
include other control variables in the discretionary accrual regression. The controls include a Big 
4 indicator (Big4) variable and a battery of other variables that capture the client’s business risk 
which affects the estimation difficulty of accruals: the natural logarithm of the firm’s operating 
cycle (OperatingCycle), the ratio of net income to total assets (ROA), the leverage ratio (Leverage), 
the loss (Loss) indicator variable, the going concern opinion indicator variable (Going_Concern), 
the market to book ratio (MB), the standard deviation of cash flows across the previous 7 years 
(Std_Cfo), the standard deviation of the firm’s sales across the previous 7 years (Std_Sale), and 
the natural logarithm of the firm’s age (Ln(Age)). We also add the number of foreign segments 
(Fsegnum), business segments (Segnum), and audit report lag (Reportlag) to further control for the 
clients’ and auditors’ difficulty in estimating accruals.8 Industry- and year- fixed effects are also 
controlled.  
Using the PCAOB inspection results as the proxy for audit quality, we are only able to test 
H2, H3, and H4. H1 is not testable using this measure because it requires client-specific loss 
                                                 





exposure. Nevertheless, H1 is more of an assumption rather than an implication of our analysis 
and is not crucial for the validity of H2- H4. We use the two models below to test H2, H3, and H4.  
𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑑𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                             (17) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡
= 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑆𝑡𝑑𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛾4𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛾7𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾9𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡                                                                              (18) 
where Num_Auditwith_Defj,t is the numeric count of audits with deficiencies as identified by the 
PCAOB inspection of audit firm j in the inspection year of t+1. Inspection year is the year when 
the PCAOB starts the inspection of the audit firm. Audit deficiencies identified by an inspection 
conducted in year t+1 should have existed in the year when the audit is finished thus should be 
earlier than year t+1. To choose a year close enough to the inspection year, we denote t as the year 
in which the audit deficiencies exist. We use the audit firm’s average client size (AvgClientsize), 
number of clients (Clientnum), and the standard deviation of client size (StdClientsize) in year t as 
the audit firm characteristics corresponding to Num_Auditwith_Defj,t and Num_Auditfailuresj,t. 
Average client size (AvgClientsize) and client number (Clientnum) are measured at the national 
audit market. Num_Auditfailuresj,t is the numeric count the audit firm’s failures as identified by 





variables are count values that are always nonnegative, we use an ordered probit regression to 
estimate models (17) and (18).9  
 The other control variables capture the PCAOB’s resource input into the inspection and 
the audit firms’ labor resources. Inspection_Duration is the number of days between the inspection 
start date and the inspection end date. A longer inspection duration indicates greater resource input 
by the PCAOB, and can be driven by either the greater riskiness of the audits selected for 
inspection or by the PCAOB-conjectured importance of the inspection. Num_Inspected is the 
number of audits inspected in a specific inspection. First_Inspection is an indicator variable set to 
1 if the inspection is the first time that the PCAOB inspects the audit firm and 0 otherwise. 
Num_Partners is the number of the audit firm’s self-reported partners at the time of the inspection. 
Num_Staff is the number of the audit firm’s self-reported personnel, except partners or 
shareholders and administrative support personnel.10 Triennially is an indicator variable set to 1 if 
the audit firm is auditing fewer than 100 U.S. public companies and 0 otherwise.11  
The empirical results for models (16) to (18) are provided in sections 4.3 and 4.4. We apply 
a probit model for our restatement analysis, following the absolute discretionary accrual model as 
specified in model (16) in constructing the control variables. Section 4.5 provides empirical results 
of the probit model that uses restatement as the audit quality proxy.  
 
4.4 DATA AND SAMPLE 
                                                 
9 Linear regression is not an appropriate estimation technique for count data, as it fails to take into account the limited 
number of possible values of the response variable. We follow Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay [1992] in using the 
ordered probit regression model.  
10 As noted in a typical inspection report, the number of partners and professional staff is an indication of the size of 
the audit firm, and does not necessarily represent the number of the audit firm’s professionals who participate in audits 
of the public companies. 





Because the data sources of the three audit quality measures (i.e. absolute discretionary 
accruals, PCAOB identified audit deficiencies, and restatement) differ, the corresponding samples 
also differ. To construct the sample for the discretionary accrual analysis, we start with the year 
2000, the first year for which Audit Analytics provides an expanded set of audit related 
information, such as the locations of auditors’ offices, audit fees, and going concern opinions, none 
of which are available in Compustat. Our sample ends in 2014. We constrain our sample to U.S.-
listed companies headquartered and incorporated in the U.S. to ensure that all audit clients in the 
sample are subject to the U.S. legal environment. We also require that the audit firms are located 
in the U.S. so that the auditors are from the same national labor market and are subject to the U.S. 
legal environment. We remove clients in the financial industry (SIC codes from 6000 to 6999) 
because financial firms are regulated and auditors’ loss exposure associated with these clients can 
be substantially different from their loss exposure associated with clients in other industries.  
We require firms to have auditor choice, auditors’ location information, and accounting 
data necessary to calculate discretionary accruals.  Also, we must be able to classify firms into 
U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas, and have other variables in the regression models.  As a result 
of these requirements, our final sample for the absolute discretionary accrual analysis contains 
39,518 firm-years. The sample covers 6,291 firms. Accounting data are obtained from Compustat 
and are winsorized at the 1th percentile and 99th percentile. The absolute values of the discretionary 
accruals are winsorized at the 99th percentile. Table 1 panel A reports the summary statistics for 






The PCAOB inspection data is purchased from Digi Data Mart Ltd. 12  The company 
extracts data contained in the PCAOB’s public inspection reports. As collected by Digi Data Mart 
Ltd., there are 2,124 unique inspections of U.S. audit firms conducted before 2015 (inclusive) 
whose inspection reports have been disclosed at the PCAOB website.13 The first year of inspection 
is 2003. We use the number of audits with deficiencies (if any) and the number of specific audit 
failures contained in these inspection reports as two measures of audit-firm level audit quality.  
Because the PCAOB does not disclose the inspected audits and a typical inspection usually 
inspects more than one audit, there is no way to precisely identify the year for which the identified 
audit deficiencies (i.e. the audit quality proxy) pertain. However, because an inspection (by 
construction) targets audits that have been finished, the identified audit deficiencies should capture 
audit quality for years before the inspection year. We obtain the audit firm’s client portfolio 
characteristics for one year before the inspection year and use this information as the audit firm 
characteristics corresponding to the identified audit deficiencies. This treatment is consistent with 
the PCAOB inspection rule (Rule 4003) – noted above. To the extent that the audit quality of audit 
firms can be expected to maintain a certain level of stability within two years, this treatment 
matches audit quality with the associated client-portfolio characteristics while avoiding arbitrary 
selection of the year of client-portfolio characteristics. 
By requiring the inspected audit firm to have client information in Audit Analytics in the 
year before inspection, we are able to manually match 708 audit firm-years between the inspection 
reports and Audit Analytics.14 Among these 708 audit firm-years, 666 audit firm-years have non-
                                                 
12 See https://auditor-inspection.myshopify.com/.  
13 The audit deficiencies identified by an inspection starting in 2015 corresponds to audit deficiencies existing in 2014.  
14 Because the names of some audit firms change, PCAOB inspection reports and Audit Analytics reports are often 
not exactly that same, we start with a computerized matching and then manually check and match the audit firms’ 
names in inspection reports with the audit firms’ names in Audit Analytics. To ensure the accuracy of the matching, 
when audit firm’s names are not exactly the same in the two sources, we check using a Google search for the phone 





missing information for the number of audits with deficiencies (or number of audit failures), 
number of audits inspected, and inspection duration. Table 2 panel A provides details of the sample 
construction and panel B provides the correlation table for the variables used in equestions (17) 
and (18). 
Restatement information is obtained from Audit Analytics. We include all types of 
restatements (i.e. restatements caused by accounting errors and those caused by accounting 
irregularities) in our analysis based on the rationale that a misstatement will not be restated if it is 
not material and that auditors are responsible for assuring that financial statements are free of any 
material misstatement, whether caused by fraud or simple error. Our restatement sample starts in 
2000, the first year for which Audit Analytics provides comprehensive restatement information, 
and ends in 2012. Ending in 2012 is consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Czerney, Schmidt, 
and Thompson [2014], Files, Sharp, and Thompson [2014]) in allowing the company or its auditor 
at least two years following the audit report year to identify issues that would require a restatement. 
 
4.5 REGRESSION RESULTS 
 Tables 2 – 5 report the results of the regressions estimated using the four categories of audit 
market with absolute discretionary accruals as the proxy for audit quality. In all the regressions, 
the dependent variable AbsoluteDAC is client-year specific. In each table, columns (1) – (5) report 
estimation results for five regressions. Before running the regression as specified in equation (16), 
we start with a simple regression in column (2) that regresses the first audit quality measure 
(AbsoluteDAC) on our first key variable of interest (Ln(Asset)) and the control variables drawn 
from model (16), while excluding AvgClientsize, Clientnum, and StdClientsize from the regression 





AbsoluteDAC on AvgClientsize, Clientnum, and StdClientsize, respectively, in each column, while 
controlling for the battery of control variables drawn from equation (16). Column (5) of each table 
reports regression results for equation (16), which is specified to test the four empirical 
implications in one model. The coefficients on all variables in the four tables are standardized for 
easier comparison. 
In Table 2, the audit market is the broad U.S. national market, which includes all publicly 
listed companies. An audit firm’s client portfolio in this market consists of all of the firm’s clients 
that are operated and incorporated in the U.S. M1(AvgClientsize), M1(Clientnum), and 
M1(StdClientsize) are the audit firm’s average client size, number of clients, and standard 
deviation of client size in the U.S. national market. The prefix M1 refers to the first category of 
audit market, i.e. national level market. As reported in column (5), the coefficient on Ln(Asset) is 
significantly negative (coefficient estimate=-0.086, t = -8.14), suggesting that as client size 
increases audit quality increases. This evidence is consistent with our first empirical prediction 
(H1). Consistent with H2, the coefficient on M1(AvgClientsize) is -0.112 (t =-5.45), suggesting 
that audit quality increases with the audit firm’s average client size in the national market. 
Furthermore, the coefficients on M1(Clientnum) and M1(StdClientsize) are 0.041 (t = -4.08) and 
0.018 (t = -1.74). These results suggest that audit quality increases as the number of clients in the 
audit firm’s client portfolio increases and decreases as the variability of client size increases. 
Additionally, the results in columns (1) – (4) are all consistent with results in column (5). 
Collectively, the evidence is supportive of the four empirical implications applied to the national 
audit market.  
In Table 3, an audit market covers U.S. public companies operating in specific 2-digit 





M2(AvgClientsize) is calculated as the audit firm’s average size of clients operating in the specific 
client’s 2-digit SIC industry. In a similar vein, M2(Clientnum) is the number of clients in the 
specific client’s 2-digit SIC industry and M2(StdClientsize) is the standard deviation of the size of 
clients in the specific industry portfolio. Columns (1) to (5) report regression results for the five 
regressions. The results reported in columns (1) to (5) are consistent with the results in Table 2 
and are supportive of our four empirical implications when we apply our analysis to the national 
client-industry audit market.   
In Table 4, the audit market is defined as clients operating in specific U.S. Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs). For each client-year, M3(AvgClientsize) is calculated as the audit firm’s 
average size of clients operating in the U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Area where the audit office of 
the specific client is located. Accordingly, M2(Clientnum) is the number of clients operating in the 
U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Area where the audit office is located. M3(StdClientsize) is the 
standard deviation of the size of clients within the specific MSA. In column (5), where the results 
of the main regression (i.e. model (1)) are reported, the coefficients on Ln (Asset), 
M3(AvgClientsize), and M2(Clientnum) are all significantly negative, and the coefficient on 
M3(StdClientsize) is significantly positive. These results further support our four empirical 
predictions.  
In Table 5, the audit market consists of companies operating in specific U.S. MSAs in 
specific 2-digit SIC industries. For each client-year, M4(AvgClientsize)is calculated as the average 
size of clients in the client’s specific 2-digit SIC industry in the specific MSA area. M4(Clientnum) 
and M4(StdClientsize) are also calculated using the auditor’s client portfolio within the specific 
industry in the MSA where the client’s audit office is located. As reported in column (5), the 





coefficients on Ln(Asset), M4(AvgClientsize), M4(StdClientsize) are all significant at the 1% level. 
Even though the coefficient on M4(Clientnum) is not statistically significant (t = -0.74), the sign 
of the coefficient is consistent with our empirical prediction. Collectively, the regression results 
estimated using the four definitions of audit markets provide supportive empirical evidence for our 
predictions derived from the theory developed in this paper.  
 
4.6. ADDITIONAL RESULTS USING PCAOB INSPECTION FINDINGS AS A PROXY FOR 
AUDIT QUALITY 
To address the concern that absolute discretionary accruals may capture client 
characteristics that we cannot fully control for, rather than audit quality, we use the PCAOB 
inspection results as additional proxies. 15  Specifically, we use the number of audits with 
deficiencies and the number of specific audit failures to measure audit quality. These two proxies 
may better capture the auditor-provided assurance associated with audit inputs rather than client-
specific characteristics. Table 6 reports the results of the regression models in which the number 
of audits with deficiencies is the dependent variable. To evaluate the effect of these control 
variables on the robustness of our empirical results, we start with three simple regressions that 
include M1(AvgClientsize), M1(Clientnum), and M1(StdClientsize), respectively.  The control 
variables in these three simplified models are the inspection duration (Inspection_Duration) and 
the number of audits inspected (Num_Inspected). Columns (1) to (3) report regression results for 
                                                 
15 In unreported analyses, we also control for the firm-fixed effect in our absolute discretionary models (i.e. the models 
in Tables 2 – 5). We find similar results (although weaker) for national audit market and audit markets as defined by 
MAS areas. Adding the firm fixed effects better tease out of effect of time-invariant firm characteristics on our 
dependent variable (i.e. AbsoluteDAC). However, if companies tend to choose auditors that have similar attributes 
(e.g., investment in technology and size), then adding firm fixed effects will also tease out the effect of client portfolio 





the three simplified models. The model in column (4) includes all of the three key independent 
variables. In columns (5) to (8), we add other control variables progressively. 
The statistical inferences for the three key independent variables as reported in columns 
(1) to (8) are consistent. Specifically, column (8) reports the regression results for equation (2) as 
specified in section 4.3. The coefficient on M1(AvgClientsize) is -0.1299 (t = -2.96), consistent 
with H2 that the assurance level increases as the average loss exposure increases. The coefficient 
on M1(Clientnum) is -0.0674 (t = -1.12), the sign of which is consistent with H3 that the assurance 
level increases as the number of clients in an audit market increases even though it is not 
statistically significant. The coefficient on M1(StdClientsize) is 0.0612 and is marginally 
significant (t = 1.84), supporting H4 that the assurance level decreases as the variability of the 
client-specific loss exposure increases in an audit market.  
In Table 7, the dependent variable is the number of the audit firm’s specific failures as 
identified by a specific inspection. The three key independent variables and all the control variables 
are the same as the variables used in Table 6. Similar to the analyses in Table 6, we start with three 
simplified models that control for Inspection_Duration and Num_Inspected and then add other 
controls step by step. The statistical inferences as reported in Table 7 are similar to the ones in 
Table 6, and are supportive of H2 and H4 without contradicting H3.  
 
4.7. ADDITIONAL RESULTS USING RESTATEMENT AS AN AUDIT QUALITY PROXY 
 Section 4.6 uses the two count variables of PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies as proxy 
measures of audit quality. To provide additional evidence, we use the likelihood of restatement as 
an alternative proxy in this section. In columns (1) to (5) of Table 8, we estimate five probit models 





characteristics in the national market. Column (1) reports results of the model that includes 
Ln(Asset) as the key independent variable, with the control variables the same as the ones in model 
(16) as specified in section 4.3. In columns (2) to (4), we add M1(AvgClientsize), M1(Clientnum), 
and M1(StdClientsize), respectively to the model in column (1). Column (5) reports results of the 
model that regresses the restatement indicator variable on the four key variables of interest: 
Ln(Asset), M1(AvgClientsize), M1(Clientnum), and M1(StdClientsize). Specifically, in column (5), 
the coefficient on M1(Clientnum) is significantly negative (coefficient = -0.2382, t = -2.11), 
suggesting that clients of audit firms with larger number of clients are less likely to restate their 
financial statement. Consistent with H4, the coefficient on M1(StdClientsize) is 0.0797 (t= 2.01). 
Taken together, the results are supportive of H3 and H4,16 and consistent with the results of the 
analyses using the absolute discretionary accruals and the PCAOB inspection results as audit 
quality proxies.  
Interestingly, in contrast to the results in Tablet 2, the coefficient on Ln(Asset) is 
significantly positive and the coefficient on M1(AvgClientsize) is insignificant. This result is 
consistent with empirical findings in the prior literature that investigates the determinants of 
restatements (e.g., Czerney, Schmidt, and Thompson [2014]) and could be driven by the fact that 
larger firms are more likely to restate earnings given that a material misstatement exists. Note that 
even though there are a substantial number of studies on restatements, the motivating factors of 
firms’ decision to restate earnings are not well understood. One study that addresses this question 
is Srinivasan, Wahid, and Yu [2014] which finds that firms operating in environments with a 
stronger rule of law are more likely to restate earnings conditional on misstatement risk. They find 
                                                 
16 We include all the years of the restatements associated with a single restatement announcement as restated years. 
Our results are robust to when we define the restatement year as the first year for which a single restatement 





a positive effect of client specific loss exposure on external auditors’ and managers’ decisions to 
restate earnings. This effect could bias our tests against finding a negative association between the 
likelihood of restatement and client’ loss exposure (i.e. Ln (Asset) and M1(AvgClientsize)). 
 
5. Concluding Comments 
 In this paper, we analyze audit production when fixed investments associated with fixed 
costs (e.g., audit technology) are important. A key feature of such investments and associated fixed 
costs is that they affect the production of audit services for multiple clients. As a result, choosing 
an optimal level of investment requires the analysis of production over a client portfolio, rather 
than on a client-by-client basis as has been done in essentially all extant literature in the economics 
of auditing since Simunic [1980], Dye [1993], and O’Keefe, Simunic and Stein [1994]. Another 
feature of our analysis is that we assume that these investments influence the production of audit 
assurance (which exists in the minds of auditors and financial statement users) through their impact 
on the efficiency of labor (labor enhancing). For instance, technology investments do not produce 
assurance directly, but make the auditor and her staff more efficient in producing assurance. 
 Our paper is in the spirit of Sutton’s [1991] endogenous / exogenous fixed cost model. 
However, we build up our analysis from basic elements that reflect our understanding of key 
features of audit production - a client specific service that is specifically tailored to suit the 
characteristics (e.g. size, complexity, and riskiness) of each client.  
 While our focus is almost exclusively on supply-side (not demand side) considerations, we 
believe that this emphasis is appropriate to understand both audit production and the market for 
audit services. The fact that supply-side variables measuring the size, complexity, and riskiness of 
client companies are able to account for 80% of the cross-sectional variation of U.S. listed 





companies where audits are mandatory. As seen in the empirical implications of our analysis 
discussed in section 3.4, the inclusion of fixed costs as an important feature of audit service 
production yields a rich set of interesting and novel insights into the audit service market not 
explored in the extant literature. For instance, Blokdijk, Drieenhuizen, Simunic, and Stein [2006] 
tried to test whether audit quality was higher for the (then) Big 5 firms compared to non-Big 5 
firms by studying total audit hours, and how those hours were utilized (e.g. risk analysis, 
substantive testing, etc.) for a sample of about 100 Dutch audits. They concluded that any audit 
quality differences were subtle and associated with the details of how audits were conducted rather 
than with differences in total audit hours, since the total audit hours of applied by Big 5 firms and 
non-Big 5 firms were virtually the same, ceteris paribus, in their sample. However, if Big 5 firms 
have higher fixed investments in the Netherlands than non-Big 5 firms, then they would be 
expected to utilize fewer audit hours, ceteris paribus. Thus the fact that the total audit hours of the 
Big 5 and non-Big 5 were the same is consistent with the provision of higher audit quality by the 
Big 5.  
 Another example of the importance of recognizing the potential role of fixed investments 
in the interpretation of evidence on audit hours is the paper by Bell, Doogar, and Solomion [2008] 
who replicate and extend the empirical tests in O’Keefe, Simunic and Stein [1994]. Bell et al. find 
that mean audit hours decreased by about 10% for the same Big 4 firm between the sample periods 
in the two studies (1989 vs. 2002) and attribute the difference to increasing use of the client 
business risk audit methodology. However, this difference in hours has alternative interpretations 






As a final example of a deepened perspective derived from our analysis relates to the large 
literature on auditor-industry specialization that originates with Craswell, Francis and Taylor 
[1995]. That literature argues that audit firms holding a high market share in a client industry (e.g. 
banking, manufacturing, etc.) are necessarily associated with the production and sale of 
differentially higher quality audit services than auditors with lower market shares. Our analysis 
applies to this setting since, presumably, the development of industry expertise requires fixed 
investment in either physical or human capital. We (indirectly) show that high market share itself 
is not sufficient to claim that audit quality is higher than average. A high market share that is based 
on servicing (perhaps) a relatively small number of large clients is likely to have this effect, since 
large clients motivate higher fixed investments which are associated with higher assurance levels. 
However, a market share derived from servicing a large number of small clients, is much less likely 
to have this effect. Moreover, even the audit firm that services large clients and has large fixed 
investments will provide an assurance level that is positively correlated with client size. That is, 
the assurance provided to small clients of a high market share auditor is not expected to be high; 
the effect is client-specific.  
 In conclusion, modeling audit production to incorporate both fixed and variable resources 
and costs yields a different perspective on the market for audit services than exists in the current 
auditing literature. We believe that further research developing and extending this perspective is 






Panel A Summary Statistics 
  N Mean STD P25 Median P75 
AbsoluteDAC 39518 0.15 0.28 0.03 0.07 0.15 
Restatement 37376 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Ln(Asset) 39518 5.48 2.44 3.81 5.53 7.21 
M1(AvgClientsize) 39518 5.43 1.78 4.84 5.87 6.71 
M2(AvgClientsize) 39518 5.42 1.96 4.54 5.62 6.79 
M3(AvgClientsize) 39518 5.43 1.94 4.45 5.74 6.85 
M4(AvgClientsize) 39518 5.44 2.23 4.08 5.55 7.02 
M1(Clientnum) 39518 454.10 292.40 159.00 503.00 686.00 
M2(Clientnum) 39518 32.22 37.25 4.00 16.00 50.00 
M3(Clientnum) 39518 21.00 21.62 6.00 13.00 30.00 
M4(Clientnum) 39518 3.61 5.21 1.00 2.00 4.00 
M1(StdClientsize) 38421 1.87 0.33 1.86 1.91 2.00 
M2(StdClientsize) 33960 1.64 0.53 1.37 1.67 1.91 
M3(StdClientsize) 37251 1.71 0.54 1.41 1.73 2.02 
M4(StdClientsize) 20492 1.47 0.82 0.92 1.44 1.92 
Big4 39518 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LogCycle 39518 4.59 0.83 4.13 4.62 5.08 
ROA 39518 -0.21 1.21 -0.10 0.02 0.07 
Leverage 39518 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.11 0.29 
Loss 39518 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Going_Concern 39518 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MB 39518 2.77 7.49 1.10 1.51 2.41 
Std_Cfo 39518 0.14 0.30 0.04 0.07 0.13 
Std_Sale 39518 0.55 1.14 0.13 0.25 0.52 
Ln(Age) 39518 2.77 0.71 2.20 2.71 3.30 
ReportLag 39518 4.12 0.37 3.97 4.14 4.33 
Num_Auditswith_Def 666 1.65 2.64 0.00 1.00 2.00 
Num_Auditfailures 666 3.47 9.13 0.00 1.00 3.00 
Inspection_Duration 667 22.96 75.92 4.00 5.00 10.00 
Num_Inspected 667 5.34 8.77 2.00 3.00 5.00 
First_Inspection 667 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Num_Partners 633 33.41 89.31 3.00 7.00 19.00 
Num_Staff 630 229.54 1006.49 9.00 27.00 96.00 
Triennially 667 0.92 0.27 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Table 1 panel A presents summary statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analyses. AbsoluteDAC is the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals. Restatement is an indicator variable set to 1 if the financial statement of a 
specific firm-year is subsequently restated and 0 otherwise. Ln(Asset) is the natural logarithm of a client’s total assets. 
M1-M4 refer to four audit markets. M1(AvgClientsize) is an audit firm’s average client size in the national market. 
M2(AvgClientsize) is an audit firm’s average size of clients operating in the specific client’s 2-digit SIC industry. 
M3(AvgClientsize) is an audit firm’s average size of clients operating in the U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Area where 
the audit office is located. M4(AvgClientsize) is an audit firm’s average size of clients in a specific 2-digit SIC industry 
in a specific MSA area. M1(Clientnum) - M4(Clientnum) are an audit firm’s numbers of clients in the corresponding 
four audit markets. M1(StdClientsize) - M4(StdClientsize) are an audit firm’s standard deviation of the size of clients 





among the audits inspected by the PCAOB in a specific inspection. Num_Auditfailures is the number of specific audit 
failures of the audits with deficiencies as identified by a specific PCAOB inspection. See Appendix A for more detailed 






Panel B Correlation Table of Key Variables in the Absolute Discretionary Accruals and Restatement Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1)AbsoluteDAC 1.00                
(2)Ln(Asset) -0.37 1.00               
 (0.00)                
(3)M1(AvgClientsize) -0.34 0.69 1.00              
 (0.00) (0.00)               
(4)M2(AvgClientsize) -0.37 0.79 0.86 1.00             
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)              
(5)M3(AvgClientsize) -0.34 0.76 0.91 0.85 1.00            
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
(6)M4(AvgClientsize) -0.37 0.91 0.76 0.87 0.83 1.00           
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)            
(7)M1(Clientnum) -0.22 0.47 0.67 0.59 0.61 0.51 1.00          
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)           
(8)M2(Clientnum) -0.07 0.15 0.34 0.17 0.25 0.15 0.54 1.00         
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)          
(9)M3(Clientnum) -0.07 0.16 0.28 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.50 0.42 1.00        
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
(10)M4(Clientnum) -0.01 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.30 0.55 0.69 1.00       
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)        
(11)M1(StdClientsize) -0.00 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.39 0.21 0.20 0.11 1.00      
 (0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
(12)M2(StdClientsize) 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.22 0.23 0.13 0.12 0.33 1.00     
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
(13)M3(StdClientsize) 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.19 0.11 0.17 0.04 0.55 0.22 1.00    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
(14)M4(StdClientsize) 0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.21 0.49 0.37 1.00   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
(15)Big4 -0.24 0.58 0.82 0.72 0.75 0.63 0.87 0.46 0.39 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.19 0.10 1.00  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
(16) Restatement 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 1.00 
 (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.95) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)  
Table 1 panel B presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the main variables used in the absolute discretionary accruals and restatement regressions. See Appendix 






Panel C Correlation Table of the PCAOB Inspection Results Regression 
  (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
(17)Num_Auditswith_Def 1.00           
            
(18)Num_Auditfailures 0.86 1.00          
 (0.00)           
(19)M1(AvgClientsize) 0.35 0.26 1.00         
 (0.00) (0.00)          
(20)M1(Clientnum) 0.55 0.52 0.51 1.00        
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
(21)M1(StdClientsize) 0.07 0.11 -0.11 0.08 1.00       
 (0.16) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10)        
(22)Inspection_Duration 0.81 0.71 0.47 0.70 0.06 1.00      
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19)       
(23)Num_Inspected 0.83 0.76 0.39 0.62 0.08 0.80 1.00     
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00)      
(24)First_Inspection -0.15 -0.10 -0.29 -0.21 -0.10 -0.19 -0.16 1.00    
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)     
(25)Num_Partners 0.10 0.11 0.42 0.67 0.05 0.37 0.35 -0.19 1.00   
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
(26)Num_Staff 0.07 0.06 0.36 0.73 0.05 0.48 0.21 -0.15 0.90 1.00  
 (0.07) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
(27)Triennially -0.70 -0.64 -0.41 -0.62 -0.11 -0.75 -0.72 0.23 -0.40 -0.30 1.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Table 1 panel C presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the main variables used in the PCAOB inspection results regression. See Appendix A for detailed 







Client Portfolio Characteristics in the National Market and the Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals  
  M1_H1 M1_H2 M1_H3 M1_H4 M1_All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(Asset) -0.111*** -0.102*** -0.108*** -0.105*** -0.086*** 
 [-10.22] [-9.93] [-9.94] [-9.84] [-8.14] 
M1(AvgClientsize)  -0.108***   -0.112*** 
  [-5.58]   [-5.45] 
M1(Clientnum)   -0.048***  -0.041*** 
   [-4.79]  [-4.08] 
M1(StdClientsize)    0.032*** 0.018* 
    [3.20] [1.74] 
Big4 -0.045*** 0.051*** -0.005 -0.061*** 0.062*** 
 [-7.20] [3.26] [-0.60] [-8.11] [3.46] 
OperatingCycle -0.034*** -0.022*** -0.035*** -0.029*** -0.030*** 
 [-3.68] [-2.71] [-3.73] [-3.15] [-3.29] 
ROA -0.231*** -0.198*** -0.231*** -0.243*** -0.241*** 
 [-8.31] [-9.00] [-8.32] [-8.56] [-8.54] 
Leverage 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 
 [3.42] [3.08] [3.31] [3.70] [3.40] 
Loss 0.004 0.028*** 0.005 0.002 0.004 
 [0.68] [5.23] [0.89] [0.36] [0.67] 
Going_Concern 0.126*** 0.113*** 0.125*** 0.119*** 0.110*** 
 [11.23] [11.18] [11.14] [10.75] [10.05] 
MB 0.043* 0.079*** 0.043* 0.048* 0.043* 
 [1.70] [4.02] [1.69] [1.84] [1.66] 
Std_Cfo 0.176*** 0.146*** 0.176*** 0.178*** 0.172*** 
 [10.33] [9.65] [10.32] [10.67] [10.35] 
Std_Sale -0.009 -0.001 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 
 [-0.91] [-0.10] [-0.95] [-0.70] [-0.81] 
LN(Age) -0.016*** -0.012** -0.017*** -0.013** -0.016*** 
 [-2.64] [-2.02] [-2.80] [-2.27] [-2.65] 
Fsegnum 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 [0.29] [0.56] [0.17] [0.21] [0.40] 
Segnum 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.004 
 [1.60] [1.00] [1.45] [1.41] [0.91] 
ReportLag 0.014** -0.001 0.013* 0.011 0.012* 
  [2.10] [-0.12] [1.92] [1.60] [1.88] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 39519 39519 39519 38422 38422 
adj. R-sq 0.3080 0.3104 0.3084 0.3191 0.3214 
Table 2 reports regression results for the audit quality model as specified in equation (16), where the dependent 
variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. An audit market is defined as the national audit market, 
covering all U.S. public companies. Ln(Asset)is the natural logarithm of a client’s total assets. M1(AvgClientsize)is an 
audit firm’s average client size in the national market. M1(Clientnum)is an audit firm’s number of clients in the 
national market. M1(StdClientsize)is an audit firm’s standard deviation of client size in the national market. See 
Appendix A for more detailed definitions of these variables and for other variable definitions. t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the 







Client Portfolio Characteristics in the National Industrial Market and the Absolute Value of 
Discretionary Accruals  
  M2_H1 M2_H2 M2_H3 M2_H4 M2_All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(Asset) -0.111*** -0.078*** -0.110*** -0.089*** -0.073*** 
 [-10.22] [-7.78] [-10.17] [-7.96] [-6.68] 
M2(AvgClientsize)  -0.109***   -0.081*** 
  [-5.55]   [-3.47] 
M2(Clientnum)   -0.044***  -0.027** 
   [-4.63]  [-2.32] 
M2(StdClientsize)    0.019** 0.015* 
    [2.18] [1.74] 
Big4 -0.045*** 0.010 -0.025*** -0.052*** 0.004 
 [-7.20] [0.84] [-3.68] [-6.87] [0.26] 
OperatingCycle -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 [-3.68] [-3.76] [-3.69] [-3.12] [-3.20] 
ROA -0.231*** -0.226*** -0.231*** -0.267*** -0.265*** 
 [-8.31] [-8.12] [-8.33] [-8.01] [-7.97] 
Leverage 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 [3.42] [3.22] [3.24] [3.17] [3.01] 
Loss 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008 
 [0.68] [1.00] [1.04] [0.88] [1.14] 
Going_Concern 0.126*** 0.118*** 0.125*** 0.089*** 0.086*** 
 [11.23] [10.79] [11.17] [7.19] [6.98] 
MB 0.043* 0.035 0.042* 0.040 0.035 
 [1.70] [1.39] [1.69] [1.28] [1.14] 
Std_Cfo 0.176*** 0.171*** 0.176*** 0.156*** 0.153*** 
 [10.33] [9.99] [10.34] [7.83] [7.68] 
Std_Sale -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 0.009 0.009 
 [-0.91] [-1.05] [-0.83] [0.84] [0.80] 
LN(Age) -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.014** -0.015** 
 [-2.64] [-2.85] [-2.94] [-2.19] [-2.32] 
Fsegnum 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 [0.29] [0.14] [0.26] [0.10] [0.13] 
Segnum 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.002 
 [1.60] [1.28] [1.48] [0.78] [0.55] 
ReportLag 0.014** 0.016** 0.012* 0.019*** 0.019*** 
  [2.10] [2.41] [1.88] [2.58] [2.59] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 39518 39518 39518 33960 33960 
adj. R-sq 0.3081 0.3099 0.3087 0.2753 0.2765 
Table 3 reports regression results for the audit quality model as specified in equation (16), where the dependent 
variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. An audit market is defined as the national industrial audit 
market, covering U.S. public companies operating in specific 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
industries. Ln(Asset)is the natural logarithm of a client’s total assets. M2(AvgClientsize)is an audit firm’s average size 
of clients operating in the specific client’s 2-digit SIC industry. M2(Clientnum)is an audit firm’s number of clients 
operating in the specific client’s 2-digit SIC industry. M2(StdClientsize)is an audit firm’s standard deviation of the 
size of clients operating in the specific client’s 2-digit SIC industry. See Appendix A for more detailed definitions of 





consistent standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent statistical 






Client Portfolio Characteristics in the MSA Market and the Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals  
  M3_H1 M3_H2 M3_H3 M3_H4 M3_All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(Asset) -0.111*** -0.091*** -0.111*** -0.105*** -0.087*** 
 [-10.22] [-8.41] [-10.17] [-9.58] [-7.86] 
M3(AvgClientsize)  -0.061***   -0.059*** 
  [-4.58]   [-4.58] 
M3(Clientnum)   -0.007  -0.013*** 
   [-1.54]  [-2.80] 
M3(StdClientsize)    0.018*** 0.017*** 
    [3.07] [2.79] 
Big4 -0.045*** -0.011 -0.042*** -0.052*** -0.014 
 [-7.20] [-1.16] [-6.68] [-8.30] [-1.45] 
OperatingCycle -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.030*** -0.031*** 
 [-3.68] [-3.69] [-3.69] [-3.28] [-3.29] 
ROA -0.231*** -0.230*** -0.231*** -0.245*** -0.244*** 
 [-8.31] [-8.30] [-8.31] [-8.53] [-8.53] 
Leverage 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 [3.42] [3.49] [3.38] [3.69] [3.72] 
Loss 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003 
 [0.68] [0.59] [0.78] [0.38] [0.47] 
Going_Concern 0.126*** 0.123*** 0.126*** 0.119*** 0.116*** 
 [11.23] [10.99] [11.21] [10.57] [10.31] 
MB 0.043* 0.040 0.043* 0.050* 0.048* 
 [1.70] [1.58] [1.70] [1.92] [1.82] 
Std_Cfo 0.176*** 0.173*** 0.176*** 0.173*** 0.171*** 
 [10.33] [10.16] [10.33] [10.24] [10.10] 
Std_Sale -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 
 [-0.91] [-0.94] [-0.91] [-0.60] [-0.63] 
LN(Age) -0.016*** -0.016** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 [-2.64] [-2.54] [-2.73] [-2.62] [-2.62] 
Fsegnum 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 [0.29] [0.20] [0.36] [0.39] [0.44] 
Segnum 0.006 0.007* 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 [1.60] [1.75] [1.54] [1.44] [1.48] 
ReportLag 0.014** 0.015** 0.014** 0.011 0.012* 
  [2.10] [2.28] [2.08] [1.62] [1.78] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 39518 39518 39518 37251 37251 
adj. R-sq 0.3081 0.3089 0.3081 0.3185 0.3194 
Table 4 reports regression results for the audit quality model as specified in equation (16), where the dependent 
variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. An audit market is defined as companies operating in the U.S. 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) where the audit office is located. Ln(Asset)is the natural logarithm of a client’s 
total assets. M3(AvgClientsize)is an audit firm’s average size of clients operating in the U.S. MSA where the audit 
office of a specific client is located. M3(Clientnum)is an audit firm’s number of clients operating in the U.S. MSA 
where the audit office is located. M3(StdClientsize)is an audit firm’s standard deviation of the size of clients operating 
in the U.S. MSA where the audit office is located. See Appendix A for more detailed definitions of these variables 





standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 






Client Portfolio Characteristics in the MSA Industrial Market and the Absolute Value of Discretionary 
Accruals  
  M4_H1 M4_H2 M4_H3 M4_H4 M4_All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(Asset) -0.111*** -0.074*** -0.111*** -0.086*** -0.059*** 
 [-10.22] [-5.38] [-10.22] [-6.05] [-3.88] 
M4(AvgClientsize)  -0.052***   -0.056*** 
  [-3.76]   [-3.36] 
M4(Clientnum)   -0.005  -0.006 
   [-0.91]  [-0.74] 
M4(StdClientsize)    0.018** 0.019** 
    [2.33] [2.50] 
Big4 -0.045*** -0.034*** -0.044*** -0.059*** -0.038*** 
 [-7.20] [-5.09] [-6.98] [-6.29] [-3.74] 
OperatingCycle -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.030** -0.031** 
 [-3.68] [-3.78] [-3.69] [-2.38] [-2.46] 
ROA -0.231*** -0.230*** -0.231*** -0.286*** -0.286*** 
 [-8.31] [-8.30] [-8.31] [-7.62] [-7.63] 
Leverage 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.033** 0.034*** 
 [3.42] [3.45] [3.40] [2.53] [2.59] 
Loss 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 [0.68] [0.73] [0.75] [0.32] [0.34] 
Going_Concern 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 
 [11.23] [11.17] [11.23] [6.29] [6.25] 
MB 0.043* 0.041 0.043* 0.041 0.038 
 [1.70] [1.63] [1.70] [1.05] [0.99] 
Std_Cfo 0.176*** 0.175*** 0.176*** 0.134*** 0.132*** 
 [10.33] [10.26] [10.33] [5.77] [5.70] 
Std_Sale -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 0.007 0.007 
 [-0.91] [-0.94] [-0.91] [0.55] [0.55] 
LN(Age) -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 [-2.64] [-2.64] [-2.72] [-2.76] [-2.81] 
Fsegnum 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 [0.29] [0.30] [0.38] [-0.44] [-0.22] 
Segnum 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 
 [1.60] [1.60] [1.52] [0.98] [1.03] 
ReportLag 0.014** 0.014** 0.013** 0.018** 0.018** 
  [2.10] [2.13] [2.05] [2.03] [2.03] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 39518 39518 39518 20492 20492 
adj. R-sq 0.3081 0.3084 0.3081 0.2799 0.2806 
Table 5 reports regression results for the audit quality model as specified in equation (16), where the dependent 
variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. An audit market is defined as companies operating in a specific 
2-digit SIC industry in a specific MSA area. Ln(Asset)is the natural logarithm of a client’s total assets. 
M4(AvgClientsize)is an audit firm’s average size of clients in a specific 2-digit SIC industry in a specific MSA area. 
M4(Clientnum)is an audit firm’s number of clients in a specific 2-digit SIC industry in a specific MSA area. 
M4(StdClientsize)is an audit firm’s standard deviation of the size of clients in a specific 2-digit SIC industry in a 
specific MSA area. See Appendix A for more detailed definitions of these variables and for other variable definitions. 





clustering at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, 






Client Portfolio Characteristics in the National Market and the Number of Audits with Deficiencies  
  The Dependent Variable is the Number of Audits with Deficiencies (Num_Auditswith_Def) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
M1(AvgClientsize) -0.0836***   -0.0550** -0.0551** -0.1286*** -0.1278*** -0.1299*** 
 [-4.54]   [-2.15] [-2.15] [-3.10] [-2.91] [-2.96] 
M1(Clientnum)  -0.0120  -0.0025 -0.0025 0.0308 -0.0733 -0.0674 
  [-0.48]  [-0.09] [-0.09] [0.63] [-1.21] [-1.12] 
M1(StdClientsize)   0.0470*** 0.0387** 0.0386** 0.0574* 0.0612* 0.0612* 
   [3.09] [2.45] [2.44] [1.88] [1.84] [1.84] 
Inspection_Duration 0.1255*** 0.0955** 0.1210*** 0.1538*** 0.1537*** 0.3155*** 0.2495*** 0.2738*** 
 [2.87] [2.04] [3.39] [3.56] [3.56] [7.27] [4.09] [4.18] 
Num_Inspected 0.2628*** 0.2596*** 0.1946*** 0.1987*** 0.1987*** 0.3010*** 0.3056*** 0.3090*** 
 [5.48] [5.55] [4.61] [4.54] [4.54] [6.68] [6.41] [6.35] 
First_Inspection     -0.0011 0.0546 0.0466 0.0445 
     [-0.03] [0.84] [0.65] [0.62] 
Num_Partners      -0.1302*** -0.3346*** -0.3307*** 
      [-2.61] [-2.85] [-2.79] 
Num_Staff       0.2538** 0.2452** 
       [2.47] [2.35] 
Triennially        0.0374 
        [0.75] 
Year Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 666 666 421 421 421 388 385 385 
pseudo R-sq 0.1473 0.1389 0.1534 0.1572 0.1572 0.1307 0.1127 0.1131 
Table 6 reports the ordered probit model regression results for the audit quality model, where the dependent variable 
is the number of audits with deficiencies (Num_Auditswith_Def). The independent variables are defined in Appendix 
A. t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** 






Client Portfolio Characteristics in the National Market and the Number of the Audit Firm’s Failures 
  The Dependent Variable is the Number of the Audit Firm’s Failures (Num_Auditfailures) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
M1(AvgClientsize) -0.0259***   -0.0169** -0.0166** -0.0656*** -0.0939*** -0.0950*** 
 [-4.82]   [-2.34] [-2.29] [-3.15] [-3.15] [-3.18] 
M1(Clientnum)  -0.0075  -0.0029 -0.0024 0.0234 -0.0054 -0.0022 
  [-1.09]  [-0.40] [-0.33] [1.03] [-0.13] [-0.05] 
M1(StdClientsize)   0.0122*** 0.0097** 0.0100** 0.0236* 0.0341* 0.0340* 
   [2.99] [2.28] [2.36] [1.70] [1.65] [1.66] 
Inspection_Duration 0.0505*** 0.0437*** 0.0442*** 0.0560*** 0.0562*** 0.1533*** 0.1525*** 0.1665*** 
 [5.03] [4.56] [5.11] [5.78] [5.76] [6.06] [3.26] [3.29] 
Num_Inspected 0.0698*** 0.0700*** 0.0515*** 0.0529*** 0.0530*** 0.0944*** 0.1241*** 0.1258*** 
 [6.11] [6.35] [5.50] [5.27] [5.25] [5.21] [4.50] [4.49] 
First_Inspection     0.0092 0.0564 0.0807 0.0795 
     [0.80] [1.51] [1.45] [1.42] 
Num_Partners      -0.0415* -0.1225* -0.1199* 
      [-1.96] [-1.71] [-1.67] 
Num_Staff       0.0837 0.0786 
       [1.33] [1.24] 
Triennially        0.0212 
        [0.81] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 666 666 421 421 421 388 385 385 
pseudo R-sq 0.1263 0.1184 0.1344 0.1387 0.1391 0.0974 0.0795 0.0798 
Table 7 reports the ordered probit model regression results for the audit quality model, where the dependent variable 
is the number of the audit firm’s failures (Num_Auditfailures). The independent variables are defined in Appendix A. 
t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** represent 








Client Portfolio Characteristics in the National Market and Likelihood of Restatement 
  M1_H1 M1_H2 M1_H3 M1_H4 M1_All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(Asset) 0.0557*** 0.0563*** 0.0574*** 0.0559*** 0.0567*** 
 [5.80] [5.70] [5.95] [5.71] [5.66] 
M1(AvgClientsize)  -0.0058   0.0091 
  [-0.31]   [0.42] 
M1(Clientnum)   -0.2416**  -0.2382** 
   [-2.19]  [-2.11] 
M1(StdClientsize)    0.0754** 0.0797** 
    [1.97] [2.01] 
Big4 0.0324 0.0492 0.1674** 0.0179 0.1214 
 [0.83] [0.74] [2.27] [0.42] [1.29] 
OperatingCycle 0.0364** 0.0363* 0.0362* 0.0385** 0.0384** 
 [1.96] [1.96] [1.95] [2.02] [2.01] 
ROA -0.0085 -0.0083 -0.0086 0.0006 0.0002 
 [-0.67] [-0.65] [-0.68] [0.04] [0.01] 
Leverage 0.0928* 0.0921* 0.0887* 0.0887* 0.0854 
 [1.76] [1.75] [1.68] [1.65] [1.58] 
Loss 0.0685** 0.0687*** 0.0718*** 0.0721*** 0.0750*** 
 [2.57] [2.58] [2.69] [2.66] [2.77] 
Going_Concern -0.1519*** -0.1547*** -0.1584*** -0.1559*** -0.1584*** 
 [-3.26] [-3.32] [-3.40] [-3.24] [-3.29] 
MB 0.0022 0.0021 0.0021 0.0026 0.0026 
 [1.20] [1.13] [1.15] [1.25] [1.23] 
Std_Cfo 0.0960** 0.0940** 0.0959** 0.1053** 0.1083** 
 [2.04] [1.98] [2.03] [2.01] [2.04] 
Std_Sale 0.0089 0.0088 0.0086 0.0073 0.0070 
 [0.95] [0.95] [0.93] [0.76] [0.73] 
LN(Age) -0.0764*** -0.0765*** -0.0785*** -0.0755*** -0.0774*** 
 [-3.37] [-3.38] [-3.47] [-3.27] [-3.36] 
Fsegnum 0.0072** 0.0072** 0.0070** 0.0070* 0.0068* 
 [2.03] [2.02] [1.98] [1.93] [1.89] 
Segnum 0.0087*** 0.0087*** 0.0086*** 0.0089*** 0.0087*** 
 [2.84] [2.84] [2.79] [2.89] [2.83] 
ReportLag 0.2309*** 0.2315*** 0.2252*** 0.2341*** 0.2272*** 
  [6.86] [6.89] [6.71] [6.81] [6.63] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 37376 37376 37376 36271 36271 
adj. R-sq 0.0518 0.0518 0.0522 0.0529 0.0533 
Table 8 reports regression results for the probit model on the effect of client portfolio characteristics in the national 
market on the likelihood of client restatement. Ln(Asset)is the natural logarithm of a client’s total assets. 
M1(AvgClientsize)is an audit firm’s average client size in the national market. M1(Clientnum)is an audit firm’s number 
of clients in the national market. M1(StdClientsize)is an audit firm’s standard deviation of client size in the national 
market. See Appendix A for more detailed definitions of these variables and for other variable definitions. t-statistics 
(in parentheses) are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that are corrected for clustering at 
the industry level. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using 





APPENDIX A  
VARIABLES DEFINITIONS 
Dependent variables  
AbsoluteDCA The absolute value of discretionary accruals. The discretionary accrual model follows the 
modified Jones (1991) model, as implemented by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) and 
modified by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). The abnormal discretionary accruals for firm 
i (which is in industry j) in year t are the difference between the total accruals (TAC) and 
predicted accruals estimated using the model specified as 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1







) + 𝛼2,𝑗,𝑡 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐺𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3,𝑗,𝑡 (
𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 .  TAC=IBC-OANCF. 
All the variables in the discretionary accrual model are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
before estimation. The estimated absolute value of abnormal discretionary accrual is winsorized 
at 99th percentile. Source: Compustat. 
Num_Auditswith_Def The number of the audits that contain audit failures among the audits inspected by the PCAOB, 
as disclosed by the inspection reports. Source: The PCAOB’s inspection reports as summarized 
by the data vendor Digi Data Mart Ltd. 
Num_Auditfailures The number of the specific audit failures contained in the audits with deficiencies as identified 
by a specific PCAOB inspection. A typical inspection report of the PCAOB will list the specific 
audit failures. The count of the specific audit failures is obtained as this variable. Source: The 
PCAOB’s inspection reports as summarized by the data vendor Digi Data Mart Ltd. 
Restatement An indicator variable set to 1 if the financial statement of a specific firm-year is subsequently 
restated and 0 otherwise.  
Independent variables  
Ln(Asset) The natural logarithm of a client’s total assets (AT). Source: Compustat. 
M1(AvgClientsize) An audit firm’s average client size in the national market. Client size is measured by the natural 
logarithm of a client’s total assets (AT). 
M1(Clientnum) An audit firm’s number of clients in the national market. Source: Audit Analytics 
M1(StdClientsize) An audit firm’s standard deviation of client size in the national market. Source: Audit Analytics 
and Compustat 
M2(AvgClientsize) An audit firm’s average size of clients operating in the specific client’s 2-digit SIC industry. 
Source: Audit Analytics and Compustat 
M2(Clientnum) An audit firm’s number of clients operating in the specific client’s 2-digit SIC industry. Source: 
Audit Analytics  
M2(StdClientsize) An audit firm’s standard deviation of the size of clients operating in the specific client’s 2-digit 
SIC industry. Source: Audit Analytics and Compustat 
M3(AvgClientsize) An audit firm’s average size of clients operating in the U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Area where 
the audit office of a specific client is located. Source: Audit Analytics and Compustat 
M3(Clientnum) An audit firm’s number of clients operating in the U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Area where the 
audit office of a specific client is located. Source: Audit Analytics  
M3(StdClientsize) An audit firm’s standard deviation of the size of clients operating in the U.S. Metropolitan 
Statistical Area where the audit office of a specific client is located. Source: Audit Analytics 
and Compustat  
M4(AvgClientsize) An audit firm’s average size of clients in a specific 2-digit SIC industry in a specific MSA area 
of a specific client. Source: Audit Analytics and Compustat 
M4(Clientnum) An audit firm’s number of clients in a specific 2-digit SIC industry in a specific MSA area of a 
specific client. Source: Audit Analytics 
M4(StdClientsize) An audit firm’s standard deviation of the size of clients in a specific 2-digit SIC industry in a 
specific MSA area of a specific client.  
Big4 An indicator variable set to 1 when a firm uses one of the Big 4 auditors (Arthur Andersen, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, or KPMG) and 0 otherwise. 






LogCycle The natural logarithm of firms’ operating cycle (360*(INVT+lag(INVT))/(2*COGS) + 
360*(AP+lag(AP))/(2*COGS)). Lag(INVT) and lag(AP) are firms’ lagged inventory and 
accounts payable. Source: Compustat. 
ROA Net income (NI) over total assets (AT). Source: Compustat. 
Leverage The ratio of year-end total liabilities (DLTT) to total assets (AT). Source: Compustat. 
Loss An indicator variable that is set to 1 when income before extraordinary items (IB) is less than 
zero and 0 otherwise. Source: Compustat. 
Going_Concern An indicator variable that is set to 1 if the auditor opinion for the fiscal year includes a going 
concern qualification and 0 otherwise. Source: Compustat. 
MB The ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets 
(AT+CSHO*PRCC_F-CEQ- TXDB)/AT). Source: Compustat. 
Std_Cfo Firm-specific standard deviation of the cash flow from operations deflated by average total 
assets from years t-7 to t-1 (cash flow = 2*OANCF/ (AT+LAG(AT)). We require at least three 
years of data available for standard variation calculation. Source: Compustat.  
Std_Sale Firm-specific standard deviation of the sales deflated by average total assets from years t-7 to 
t-1 (sales = 2*SALE/ (AT+LAG(AT)). We require at least three years of data available for 
standard variation calculation. Source: Compustat. 
Ln(Age) The natural logarithm of firm-specific age. Age is calculated as the difference between the 
current year and the first year the firm appears in Compustat. Source: Compustat. 
Fsegnum The total number of foreign segments; this is coded as 0 when this information is missing in 
the segment file. Source: Compustat. 
Segnum The total number of business segments; this is coded as 1 when this information is missing in 
the segment file. Source: Compustat. 
ReportLag The natural logarithm of the lag between the auditor’s signature date and the date of the fiscal 
year-end. Source: Audit Analytics. 
Inspection_Duration The number of days between the inspection start date and the inspection end date. Source: The 
PCAOB’s inspection reports as summarized by the data vendor Digi Data Mart Ltd. 
Num_Inpsected The number of audits inspected in a specific inspection. Source: The PCAOB’s inspection 
reports as summarized by the data vendor Digi Data Mart Ltd. 
First_Inspection An indicator variable set to 1 if the inspection is the first time that the PCAOB inspects the 
audit firm and 0 otherwise. Source: The PCAOB’s inspection reports as summarized by the 
data vendor Digi Data Mart Ltd. 
Num_Partners The number of the audit firm’s self-reported partners at the time of the inspection. Source: The 
PCAOB’s inspection reports as summarized by the data vendor Digi Data Mart Ltd. 
Num_Staff The number of the audit firm’s self-reported personnel of the audit firm, except partners or 
shareholders and administrative support personnel. Source: The PCAOB’s inspection reports 
as summarized by the data vendor Digi Data Mart Ltd. 
Triennially An indicator variable set to 1 if the audit firm is auditing fewer than 100 U.S. public companies 
and 0 otherwise. Source: The PCAOB’s inspection reports as summarized by the data vendor 
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